Transformation of the Polish Banking Sector by Marek Stefański
Ma rek  Ste fań ski*
Trans for ma tion of the Po lish Ban king Sec tor
Sum ma ry
In the post-war period the banking system in Poland underwent two important system
transitions: after 1946 and after 1989. The third transformation began after May 1, 2004,
but it did not have a systemic character. The Polish banking sector started to operate on
the Single European Market. The first part of the paper is devoted to the problems of the
banks’ transformations after 1989 with a special focus on the quantitative development
of banks in 1989–2008, and on subsequent privatisation and consolidation processes.
The former intensified in 1989–1999, and the latter in 1999–2002. The consolidation
process was very noticeable in the sector of cooperative banks after 1994. The second part
of the paper includes an economic and financial analysis of the banks. A lot of attention
was paid to the liquidity of the banking sector. It was assessed as good, which was
confirmed by a short-term rating of Moody’s and by the Financial Stability Report 2009,
published by the National Bank of Poland in June 2009. The comparison of the net profit
of the banking sector in 1997–2008 shows its dependence on the economic situation and
policy. The number of banks with capital adequacy ratio well above the minimum required
by the banking supervision is rising. The financial power ratings are not favorable for the
domestic banks. The third part of the paper focuses on the development directions of the
Polish banking sector. It may be concluded on the basis of the analysis that privatisation
and consolidation processes will be continued. They will concentrate on the capital of
foreign banks already operating in Poland. As compared with individual foreign banks,
the potential of the Polish banking sector is week. The fourth part of the paper focuses on
the presentation Polish banking sector in the context of European Union banking sector.
The paper finishes with conclusions. Generally, Polish banks have to implement a strategy
to enable them to compete on the Single European Market, i.e. to look for new revenue
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Vizja - Kwartalnik 011-2009:Vizja 2009-10-29 10:33 Strona 37sources, to reduce costs and improve their loan portfolios. The comparison of selected
aspects of the Polish banking sector in the most developed EU Member States shows that
the differences are still too large. Therefore, it seems correct to claim that the Polish
banking system is undergoing another transition. It is adjustment to the Single European
Market.
Introduction
Main target of the paper is presentation selected aspects the Polish banking sector in
the transition period (1989–2008). Banking system composes banks (created banking
sector) and external institutions relatively to them (Zaleska, 2007). The most important
external institutions are: central bank, supervision of banking market, guarantee deposit
system. The article focuses on analysis of banking sector, which present functioning banks
(commercial and cooperative). Author makes economic and financial analysis of the
banking sector and present changes in banking law. His study should answer for following
questions: Is Polish banking sector stable? Do Polish banks act in accordance with the
principle of an open market economy with free competition on the Single European
Market? What is the position of the Polish banking sector in the European Union?
1. Changes in the system after 1989
The banking system in Poland underwent two transformations related to the political
system after World War II. The first one took place immediately after the war due to the
intervention from the outside supported by indicative planning (Jezierski, Leszczyńska,
2001). The second political system-related transformation began in 1989. The Banking
Law and the Act on the National Bank of Poland (NBP) were essential for creating the
new banking system. They were the basis for building the system of market banking
enterprises striving mainly for profits. NBP was transformed into a modern central bank
(Wójtowicz, pp. 18–25). From May 2004 NBP became member of European System of
Central Banks. The ESCB comprises the European Central Bank and the national central
banks (NCBs) of all EU Member States (Article 107.1 of the Treaty) whether they have
adopted the euro or not. The process of setting up commercial banks and banks with
foreign capital was started. Privatization of banks was made possible.
The third transformation, not related to the political system, began upon Poland’s
joining the European Union. The banking sector and the National Bank of Poland began
activity on the Single European Market where acquis communautaire including free flow
of capital and services are in force. The privatization of these rules began. NBP has
launched SORBNET-EURO, a payment system enabling settling local and transnational
payments in euro. The system is connected with the European TARGET (Trans-European
Automated Real – time Gross – settlement Express Transfer-system).
The NBP, Bank Handlowy (since 1870), Bank Gospodarki Żywnościowej (since
1975), Pekao SA (since 1929), Bank Rozwoju Eksportu (since 1986), PKO BP (1988)
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From February 1989 new banks began to rise in number. The record number of 45
licenses was issued in 1990. 22 banks began conducting business in that year. The process
of change in the banking cooperatives was started. The licensing policy was made stricter
in order to avoid setting up a large number of small, weak banks. 17 licenses were issued
in 1991 and 32 banks began conducting business. The nine emerged from the NBP were
commercialized at the end of 1991, i.e. they were transformed into state-owned
shareholder companies. The banking sector was burdened with “bad credits” in 1992–
1993. As a result, the licensing policy was made stricter and the minimum capital was
increased to ECU 5 millions. Only 6 new licenses were issued and 12 new banks began
activity. In 1993, the banking sector as a whole suffered a loss. Banks, mainly
cooperatives, were going to bankruptcy. The NBP issued only one license.
The position of cooperative banks was difficult. The Act of Restructuring of
Cooperative Banks and Bank Gospodarki Żywnościowej from June 24, 1994 was an
attempt to improve it. BGŻ became a stock company jointly owned by the State and
cooperative banks. The co-operative banking sector took on a three-level structure with
BGŻ SA as a state bank, eight regional banks and associated cooperative banks.
Cooperative banks were also associated in three associating banks that had been set up
earlier. In 1994, foreign banks were allowed to invest in Poland on condition that a bank
with financial difficulties would be acquired or financial support would be provided for
it. 82 commercial banks and 1,612 cooperative banks were active at the end of that year.
The number of banks on the Polish market were so large, but there was no general
system of guaranteeing deposits. Therefore, the urgent need to set up a deposit guarantee
system occurred. The Act on Bank Guarantee Fund (BGF) was adopted on December 14,
1994. The Bank Guarantee Fund – an independent subject of the public law being a legal
person clearly separated from the government agency – was created based on it. Two
functions of the BGF have been entrusted. The first of them is connected with the common
obligation to guarantee deposits. The other consists in assisting banks if their solvency is
threatened. In January 1998 BGF was enabled to influence the banking regulatory policy
by means, that its president participates in the works of the Banking Supervision
Commission. The experience heretofore gained shows that the Fund contributes to the
stability of the banking sector. Amount of warranted deposit went up considerably in
2008, which totals takes away equivalence in zloty, 50 000 euro presently.
Years 1995–1997 were good for banks. However, 4 commercial banks and 93
cooperative banks went to bankruptcy. Acquisitions, mergers, privatizations and
consolidations were intensified. 83 commercial banks and 1,295 cooperative banks were
active at the end of 1997. The NBP fulfilled supervisory functions over banks in period
of 1989–1997 (NBP, 2007: 13).
Period of 1998–2004 abounded with events on the banking market. The banking law,
the NBP act and the act on debentures and mortgage – all of them from August 29, 1997
– took effect at the beginning of 1998. New supervision over banks was established. It was
Banking Supervision Commission, acting to the end of 2007 (NBP, 2007: 41). The number
of bankruptcies of banks decreased, few specialized banks were set up. The first mortgage
bank – Rheinhyp BRE Bank Real State SA – started its operations. Mergers and
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in the end of 1999. The consolidation process began in the cooperative banking sector (Act
on functioning of cooperative banks, their associations and associating banks). 
As a result of these changes, 69 commercial banks and 642 cooperative banks were
conducting operations in the end of 2001. In the end of 2002, their number was 59 and
605, respectively: 57 and 596 in the end of 2004; 52 and 579 in the end of 2008. The
process of consolidation of banks got stronger in 1999–2003. The banking law was
gradually aligned with European Union directives. The two-level banking system became
distinct. It had a significant influence on the performance of banking system (Stefański,
2004). As a result of the privatization, the share of banks (assets of banks) controlled by
the State decreased from 66,5% in 1996 to 20,5% in 2004, and to 17,3% in 2008. The
government is only owner of the Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego and controls (directly
or indirectly) the operations of PKO BP SA, Bank Pocztowy SA and Bank Ochrony
Środowiska SA. The sector is dominated by banks controlled by foreign investors which
have the share about 70% from 2000 (table 1). A strong position of banks controlled by
foreign investors is typical for Central European banking sectors. Their share in assets in
2003 was higher in Czech Republic: 96%, Estonia: 97,5%, Lithuania: 95,6%, Hungary:
83,3%, Slovakia: 99,6% (more information on this subject in ECB, 2005). Similar level
is still maintained (Czech Republic: 92%; Estonia: 97%; Lithuania: 83%; Slovakia: 96%;
Bulgaria: 82%; more information on this subject in ECB, 2008: 36–49).
Among many reasons of this situation, two things seem to be the most important. In
the initial period of transformation, these countries lacked private investors having capital
sufficient for participating in the privatization of banks. The second reason was adopting
the privatization strategy for searching the industry strategic investor. The example of
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Ta ble  1.  Struc  tu  re of the Po  lish ban  king sec  tor in 1996–2008
Gro  up of banks
Num ber  of  banks  con duc ting  ope ra tions 
(ban  krupt banks and banks in li  qu  ida  tion are not in  c  lu  ded)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2006 2008
1. Com  mer  cial banks and
bran chesof  cre dit 
in sti tu tions
81 81 83 77 73 69 59 58 57 63 70
2. Banks with a ma  jo  ri  ty
sha re  of  sta te  ca pi tal 24 15 13 7 7 7 7 6 5 4 4
3. Banks with a ma  jo  ri  ty
sha reof  pri va te  ca pi tal 
in c lu ding:
57 66 70 70 66 62 52 52 52 59 66
3.1. banks con  trol  led by
Po lish  in ve stors 32 38 39 31 20 16 7 6 8 7 6
3.2. banks con  trol  led by
fo re ign  in ve stors 25 28 31 39 46 46 45 46 44 52 60
4.  Co -ope ra ti ve  banks 1 394 1 295 1 189 781 680 642 605 600 596 584 579
5. Ban  king sec  tor 1 475 1 376 1 272 858 753 711 664 658 653 647 649
Vizja - Kwartalnik 011-2009:Vizja 2009-10-29 10:33 Strona 40Poland proves that the funds of local governments and people’s savings were not used for
the privatization of banks.
The increasing share of the foreign capital in Polish banks is perceived on one hand
as a opportunity of the Polish banking sector quicker growth, but on the other hand as
a threat to its sovereignty (Jaworski, Zawadzka, 2001). The ownership structure is
important for the stability of the banking sector because it affects the quality of the
corporate governance, efficiency of work of banks and their development potential.
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So  ur  ce: (BSC, 2005: 31–32) and (PFSA, 2009, Sta  ti  sti  cal An  nex).
Gro  up of banks
As  sets (as a per  cen  ta  ge of the ban  king sec  tor)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2006 2008
1.  Com mer cial  banks 95.4 95.5 95.7 95.8 95.8 95.4 95.0 94.8 94.7 93.8 94.6
2. Banks with a ma  jo  ri  ty
sha re  of  sta te  ca pi tal 66.5 49.3 45.9 23.9 22.9 23.5 25.1 24.4 20.5 19.8 17.3
3. Banks with a ma  jo  ri  ty
sha re  of  pri va te  ca pi tal 
in c lu ding:
28.9 46.2 49.8 71.8 72.9 71.9 69.9 70.4 74.2 74.0 77.3
3.1. banks con  trol  led by
Po lish  in ve stors 15.1 30.9 33.2 24.6 3.4 3.2 2.5 2.6 6.6 4.3 5.0
3.2. banks con  trol  led by
fo re ign  in ve stor s1 13.7 15.3 16.6 47.2 69.5 68.7 67.4 67.8 67.6 69.7 72.3
4.  Co -ope ra ti ve  banks 4.6 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.6 5.0 5.2 5.3 6.2 5.4
5. Ban  king sec  tor 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Gro  up of banks
Lo ans  (as  a per cen ta ge  of  lo ans  to  non -fi nan cial  sec tor)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2006 2008
1. Com  mer  cial banks and
bran  ches of cre  dit 
in sti tu tions
93.9 94.5 95.0 94.9 94.6 94.2 93.5 92.9 92.2 93.0 93.5
2.  Co ope ra ti ve  banks 6.1 5.5 5.0 5.1 5.4 5.8 6.5 7.1 7.8 7.0 6.5
3. Banks with a po  lish 
in ve stors 84.0 81.8 78.1 49.1 29.8 28.7 29.6 30.3 33.2 30.1 28.6
4. Banks with a fo  re  ign 
in ve stors 16.0 18.2 21.9 50.9 70.2 71.3 70.4 69.7 66.8 69.9 71.4
Gro  up of banks
De po sits  (as  a per cen ta ge  of  de po sits  non -fi nan cial  sec tor)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2006 2008
1. Com  mer  cial banks and
bran chesof  cre dit 
in sti tu tions
94.5 94.8 94.8 95.0 94.8 94.4 93.8 93.4 93.0 91.4 91.2
2.  Co ope ra ti ve  banks 5.5 5.2 5.2 5.0 5.2 5.6 6.2 6.6 7.0 8.6 8.8
3. Banks with a po  lish 
in ve stors 87.8 87.3 86.3 54.4 36.5 36.1 37.8 37.4 37.3 33.5 32.4
4. Banks with a fo  re  ign 
in ve stors 12.2 12.7 13.7 45.6 63.5 63.9 62.2 62.6 62.7 66.5 67.6
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funds enabling its growth. Capital injections to local banks, implementation of modern
management methods and on-line banking technologies are positive results of the
involvement of foreign investors. They came from countries enjoying a high level of
economic development: the assets of Polish banks were dominated by German, Italian,
American, Dutch, Belgian, Irish, Portuguese and French capital (BSC, 2005). In the end
of 2008 the assets of Polish banks are dominated by Italian, Dutch, German, American,
Belgian and Irish (PFSA, 2009). As a still developing country, Poland will need foreign
capital, which can help to direct the Polish banking sector for competition. During the
financial crisis pointed out the necessity of government intervention in banking sector
throughout buying back bank stocks even nationalization (EIU, 2009: 4–9).
The decrease of local investors share in the assets of the banking sector from 33,2%
in 1998 to 6,6% in 2004 and to 5,0% in 2008 is an alarming trend for the Polish banking
sector. The big state share in the assets animates the discussion about the completion of
the privatization of banks because the state is not a good owner (Chałaczkiewicz, 2003).
This is confirmed by experiences of many countries. As far as this is concerned, Poland
is still far behind the developed countries. However, private ownership must not be
considered a “miraculous medicine” against economic issues. This thesis becomes
genuine more and more in time of financial slump, in which many governments supplied
private banks with capitals or even nationalized.
The privatization and consolidation of the banking sector have led to a change in its
structure. There is an upward trend in the concentration of commercial banks measured
with the ratio of the fifteen largest banks share in the sector assets, deposits and credits
as well as fluctuations if the effect is measured with the Herfindahl-Hirschman index
(table 2).
The concentration index (HH) has been declining since 2001 although the number of
banks is decreasing. The ratio of share of the fifteen largest banks is decreasing from
2001. This means that the share of small and medium banks in the banking service market
is increasing. They compete with the largest banks, mainly in selected market niches.
The banking sector in the Central European countries is relatively highly
concentrated. The concentration level is lower in Poland than in smaller countries of the
region. The situation in the EU countries is similar: the concentration is the highest in
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Table 2. Concentration of the banking sector in Poland in 1999–2008
* date 2007.
Source: (BSC, 2005: 41; ECB, 2009: 38) and (PFSA, 2009, Statistical Annex).
Specification (measure)
Years
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2006 2008
1. Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(in points): assets 731 705 821 792 753 692 599 640*
2. Ratio of share of the fifteen largest
banks (in percentage):
assets 79.0 78.8 82.4 82.6 81.1 79.9 76.6 73.2
deposits 83.5 82.6 85.4 85.6 84.8 82.9 80.8 78.4
credits 77.5 76.8 81.3 79.9 78.2 77.2 75.2 73.7
Vizja - Kwartalnik 011-2009:Vizja 2009-10-29 10:33 Strona 42Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Netherlands, Lithuania and lower in large countries such as
Germany, United Kingdom, Spain and Italy. The absolute size of the banking service
market is much larger in those countries which creates opportunities for profitable
operations for a larger number of entities (ECB, 2009: 36).
2. Economic and financial standing of banks
Essential ratios describing the financial stability of banks include liquidity, financial
result, solvency, return on assets and return on equity.
Liquidity of banks means their ability to pay current liabilities. Temporary difficulties
in satisfying creditors may impose selling assets below their value which generates losses
for the bank. Maintaining liquidity entails alignment of receivables and payables
according to maturity dates and due dates. The gap analysis is designed for this purpose
among other things (Białek, 1994). The gap consists in the difference between assets and
liabilities with a given maturity period. The major source of the risk of liquidity loss is the
mismatch between contractual maturities of assets and liabilities and turbulence on global
financial markets. Consequently to the escalation of the financial crisis and further
decrease in confidence between market participants there was a limitation of market
liquidity and practical elimination of transactions with longer maturities. This was also
visible in Poland (PFSA, 2009: 65).
Despite the relatively stable situation in respect of liquidity, the following negative
aspects should be mentioned. The first is increased mismatch between assets and liabilities
with to maturities of up to 1 month and over 1 year. The negative gap for up to 1 month
increased from PLN 257,0 billions in the end of 2007 to PLN 274,1 billions in the end of
2008, and the positive gap for over 1 year – from PLN 277,8 billions to PLN 368,8 billions
respectively. The increase in the mismatch was a consequence of the very fast growth of
lending, which was developed on the basis of short-term liabilities and the liquidation of
part of liquid assets, mainly amounts due from the financial sector. The second is fast
growing negative balance in settlements with the financial sector, resulting from expansive
lending policy. Consequently, liquidity decreases and sensitivity to situation on financial
markets increases. Positive aspects include the increase in stable deposits from PLN 235,1
billions (2007) to PLN 302,4 (2008) (PFSA, 2009: 66). Despite the increase in value, the
share in the balance sheet total slightly lowered to 29%.
The stability of sources of financing is also very important. Stable sources include
deposits of households and enterprises; deposits of financial institutions (including banks)
are deemed to be less stable. Financing a large part of the operations of the bank with
deposits of financial institutions is dangerous due to their large amounts and short due
dates. Withdrawal of such deposit may cause payment problems for the bank and impose
selling assets on it. Deposits of non-financial entities, especially households and SMEs
not cause such danger due to, among other things, their small amounts. The so-called
residue effect occurs in the liabilities of the bank for periods longer than contractual
(Dobosiewicz, Marton-Gadoś, 2005).
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the banking sector amounted to 11–20% and to the non-financial sector 58–65%
accordingly. In 2008 it was 23,3% and 47% respectively. Decrease results in
intermediaries role of banks in transformation savings on investments is called in
economic literature disintermediation (Hawken, 1981). It results from different authors,
that households piled in Poland in banks, in the form of deposits in 2007 – 43,7% of
global savings and respectively: in 2008 – 55,4%; in 1998 – 85,8% (Stefański, 2006a:
256; NBP, 2009: 49). The share of payables to the non-financial sector from the four
largest banks in Poland is shown in table 3. They enabled stating a high stability of the
sources of financing of the largest Polish banks although the share of payables to
non-financial institutions decreased in some of them.
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The share of liquid assets, i.e. balance sheet items that can be relatively quickly used
for satisfying creditor’s claims, remained high in 1996–2003 as well. The liquid assets to
total assets ratio was 33–43% (liquid assets include cash, funds on the NBP account, bank
deposits with maturity of up to 1 month, debt securities admitted to public trade, mutual
fund units). The amount of the liquid assets exceeded payables to institutional depositors.
The liquid assets ratio lowered to 29% in the end of 2008 and it was negative trend.
The liquidity of banks can also be determined using credits to deposits ratio
(non-financial sector deposits and credits were used). That ratio was growing up to 77%
from the beginning of 1990’s to 2000 because the dynamics of credits exceeded that of
savings significantly. It decreased to 68% in 2000–2001. In 2002, as interest rates were
decreased and the tax on capital revenues from interest rates on deposits was introduced,
the increase rate of deposits declined; a nominal decrease was noted at the end of that
year. Aquick increase in credits extended by banks at the same time caused growth of the
credit to deposit ratio to about 76% in 2003–2004. In 1996–2004, the ratio was contained
in the 64–77% range. These values are believed to be safe. The liquidity of a bank would
deteriorate if the value of the ratio was close to 100% or if the amount of the credits
extended the amount of the deposits accepted. Such situation appeared in Poland in 2007
and credit to deposit ratio increased to 125,3% in the end of 2008. This index is adverse,
but it wrote down it in many countries (Fitch Ratings, 2008). Such situation was kept in
the first quarter of 2009. 
Table 3. Share of payables to the non-financial sector in the liabilities of the four largest banks in Poland (in
%)
Source: Own calculations based on information obtained from the banks.
Banks
Years
1999 2002 2003 2004 2008
1. PKO BP SA 90.1 85.6 84.5 82.9 75.7
2. Pekao SA 74.6 73.8 72.1 69.9 27.9
3. BRE SA 42.7 37.6 37.7 52.1 45.7
4. ING Bank Śląski SA 69.4 73.7 73.4 74.6 60.3
Vizja - Kwartalnik 011-2009:Vizja 2009-10-29 10:33 Strona 44The satisfactory liquidity of Polish banks is confirmed by ratings assigned by agencies
(table 4). The ten largest banks (62,5% of banking sector assets in 2008) are assessed
positively as far as short-term payables are concerned. Ability of six banks to pay them
was assessed very good and that of three other was assessed good.
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Banks’ is generating a positive result for their stability. Banks’ profits are the main
source of increases in capital which, in turn, enhance their ability to further expand and
absorb losses, if any. In 1997–2004, banks’ profits after tax were sinusoidal trend and
increased in 2008 very strongly (chart 1). In 2008, net profit of the banking sector
amounted to PLN 13,9 billions, which was the historical peak, but it was higher by 2,1%
only than in 2007. Out of 649 banks and branches of credit institutions conducting
operations, the majority reported better financial results than in 2007. 85 banks reported
deterioration of financial results (22 commercial banks, 5 credit institutions and 58
cooperative banks). Nearly 40% of the profit of the banking sector was generated by two
largest banks: PKO BP SA and Pekao SA, which emphasizes their dominant role in the
sector.
The comparison of the net profit (after tax) of the banking sector in 1997–2008 shows
its dependence on the economic situation and policy. After two poor years, 2004 and
further were a record years for banks as far as profits are concerned. Banks owe those
good results to a better economic situation and the increase in demand for banking
services. Due to the improvement in customers’ standing, provisions did not have to be
as large as in two preceding years. Better results were also due to the completion of the
restructuring by most of the banks and the decrease in the corporate income tax rate from
27% to 19%. However, performance ratios – NIM, ROA, ROE and CIR – as well as
profitability and cost level ratios show a downward trend (table 5). Such situation is
Table 4. Moody’s short-term ratings of 10 largest commercial banks (June 2009)
1STMR – Short Term Most Recent Rating;NP – Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Not Prime do not fall
within any of the Prime rating categories; P–1 (Prime-1) means a very strong capacity for timely payment);
P–2 (Prime-2) – strong capacity.
Source: www.moodyseurope.com/ratinglist/.
Bank STMR
PKO BP SA P–11
Pekao SA P–1
BRE SA P–2
ING Bank Śląski SA P–1
BZ WBK SA P–1
Millennium SA P–2
Bank Handlowy SA wWarszawie P–2
Kredyt Bank SA P–1
Getin Bank SA NP
BGŻ SA P–1
Vizja - Kwartalnik 011-2009:Vizja 2009-10-29 10:33 Strona 45advantageous in case of indicators only CIR and CL. Ratios of cooperative banks are
much better than those of commercial banks except CIR.
Banks are obliged to maintain equity at a level ensuring security of the deposits and
enabling coverage of unexpected losses. Prudence regulations of the Polish Financial
Supervision Authority set forth detailed minimum capital requirements imposed on banks.
Banks’ equity funds (so-called regulation capital) in relation to the total of so-called capital
requirements by virtue of each risk should not be lower than 15% and 12% in the first and
the second year of the operations of the bank and not lower than 8% in each subsequent
year. Banks’ equity funds should be no lower than 8 % of capital requirements according
to Capital Requirement Directive, called Basel II (Stefański, 2006).
WSPÓŁCZESNA EKONOMIA Nr 3/2009(11)
46
Table 5. Selected performance and profitability ratios of banks in 1997–2008 (in %)
NIM – Net Interest Margin (interest income / average assets minus mature interest on irregular receivables);
ROA – Return on Assets (profit after tax / assets minus mature interest on irregular receivables);
ROE – Return on Equity (profit after tax / equity); it should exceed 15%;
CIR – Cost-Income-Ratio – operating costs (operations and depreciation) to banking operations result ratio;
Gross profitability – result before tax to total costs ratio;
Net profitability – result after tax to total costs ratio;
CL – cost level (total costs to total revenues).
Source: (BSC, 2005), (BSC, 2007) and (PFSA, 2009, Statistical Annex).
Ratios
Years
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2006 2008
NIM 5.6 4.8 4.2 4.2 3.7 3.4 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.4
ROA 2.1 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 1.5 1.8 1.6
ROE 34.1 9.1 12.9 14.2 13.1 5.8 5.8 17.6 22.4 21.2
CIR 55.0 62.2 63.2 62.3 61.6 63.9 68.2 65.1 58.6 54.7
Gross profitability 19.5 9.9 10.7 8.9 7.0 4.5 6.2 11.0 15.5 10.6
Net profitability 13.2 3.9 6.7 6.3 5.1 2.7 3.2 10.0 12.7 8.7
CL 83.7 91.0 90.4 92.3 93.5 95.7 94.2 90.1 86.6 89.4
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percentage of commercial and cooperative banks with solvency ratios in the 8–30% range
was growing constantly. Financial crisis and the new capital requirements resulted in the
deterioration of the solvency ratio of banks (table 6). At the beginning of 2008 full
implementation of all provisions of CRD into the Polish system was carried out. In 2008
own funds of the banking sector increased from PLN 61,8 billions in 2007 to PLN 75,0
billions. The increase in own funds was mainly due to the increase in core funds (due to
the fact that 60% of profits for 2007 was left at banks). All commercial banks met the
requirement of holding minimum own funds at the level of EUR 5 millions. Due to the
rapid depreciation of PLN, in the second half of 2008, 79 cooperative banks did not meet
the requirement of holding minimum own funds at the level of EUR 1 million in the
year-end. In 2008 total capital requirement increased from PLN 40,7 billions in the end
of 2007 to PLN 55,6 billions in the end of 2008. 
The increase in total requirement was caused by two factors. Firstly, due to very high
growth of lending activity credit risk rose and in the end of 2008 the requirement in this
respect accounted for 87,6% of the total requirement. Secondly, it was necessary to take
into account the operational risk requirement in capital adequacy account from the
beginning of 2008 and in the end of the year capital requirement in this respect accounted
for 10,2%. The importance of other requirements was marginal (2,2%). The increase in
the total capital requirement was not offset by sufficiently large increase in own funds. As
a consequence, the average capital adequacy ratio of the banking sector decreased from
12,1% (2007) to 10,8% (2008). The lower capital adequacy ratio was observed mainly in
commercial banks, where it dropped from 12,0% to 10,7%. In cooperative banks, the
average capital adequacy decreased only from 13,8% to 13,2% (PFSA, 2009: 72–74).
Assuming, capital adequacy of the banking was satisfactory. The funds held by banks
sufficiently covered the risk related to their operations and permitted their further
development.
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Table 6. Local banks by solvency ratio in 2006–2008 (as a percentage of the total number)
a – commercial banks
b– cooperative banks
Source: Own calculations on the basis ( PFSA, 2009 ).
Ratio in % 2006 2007 2008
below 8 a 0.0 0.0 1.9
b 0.2 0.2 0.2
over 8 – below 10 a 3.9 8.0 23.0
b 10.3 10.8 6.0
over 10 – below 12 a 19.6 38.0 32.8
b 14.7 16.0 23.0
over 12 – below 15 a 35.3 20.0 11.5
b 21.6 20.5 25.6
over 15 a 41.2 34.0 30.8
b 53.2 52.5 45.2
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that the Polish banking sector is relatively stable.
Rating agencies also analyses banks’ operations as a whole (so-called financial
strength of banks, BFSR). They are marked from A to E, according to agency. The first
mark (A) means a high reliability and financial strength of the bank, the latter mark (E)
is a very low financial strength close to the loss of payment capacity. Signs “+” and “–“
meaning that the class assigned is temporary and the bank may be upgraded or
downgraded are often added. The analysis of the financial strength of Polish banks allows
to believe that they are rather weak (table 8).
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Table 7. Moody’s long-term ratings of the ten largest banks (June 2009)
1LTR – Long Term Rating; A– good credit quality; Baa – adequate credit quality; Additional numbers mean the place of the
bank within basic letter-marked classes: 1 means that the bank is located in the better part of the class, 2 means the middle
part and 3 – the lower part.
Source: as for table 4.
Bank LTR1
PKO BP SA A2
Pekao SA A2
BRE SA A3
ING Bank Śląski SA A2
BZ WBK SA Baa2
Millennium SA A3
Bank Handlowy SA wWarszawie A3
Kredyt Bank SA A2
Getin Bank SA Ba3
BGŻ SA A3
Table 8. Moody’s financial strength ratings of the ten largest banks (June 2009)
1 BFSR – Bank Financial Strength Rating.
Source: as for table 4.
Bank BFSR1
PKO BP SA C–
Pekao SA C–
BRE Bank SA D
ING Bank Śląski SA D+
BZ WBK SA D+
Millennium SA  D
Bank Handlowy SA wWarszawie D+
Kredyt Bank SA D
Getting Bank SA D–
BGŻ SA D
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deteriorated. The banking industry as a whole will be able to absorb the effects of the
crisis without jeopardizing the safety of its operation. Analyses confirm this thesis (NBP,
2009a: 31–83). The special European Union overview shows which type of measures
have so far been taken by individual member states that decided to intervene in support
of financial institutions. In the period of 2007–2009 Polish government did not provide
assistance to banks (CEC, 2009a: 15–16). This fact confirms its good financial situation.
3. Banking sector development trends
The banking market in Poland is dominated by 15 banks, the assets of which are
about 80% of total sector assets. Therefore, other banks hold about 15% of assets taking
into account the share of the cooperative banks. Those are small banks, often regional or
highly specialized.
No major consolidation of banks took place in period of 2002–2004 (Stefański, 2004).
However, it should be expected soon because the economic potential of banks in Poland
is low. PKO BP SA, the largest Polish bank, has 180 place in the world-wide ranking of
banks by own funds in 2008 and fourth in the Central Eastern European Countries (The
Banker, 2009). Such consolidation will also reflect mergers world-wide. If two institutions
merge, they consolidate their businesses or sell them to other institutions. It can be
expected that any bank in the world may be acquired except for the first twenty by balance
sheet total and market capitalization. Moreover, the banking sector is believed to be the
most scattered and, therefore, numerous mergers and acquisitions are forecast for the
years to come. It is even expected that 30% of the global banking market will be controlled
by three large financial institutions (ATKEARNEY, 2004). The implementation of the
rules of the New Capital Agreement (Basel II) will cause a great wave of acquisitions
and mergers (Charofas, 2004). Banking sector structure did not change significantly in
period of 2004–2008. The number of domestic commercial banks decreased from 54 to
52. The number of branches of credit institutions increased from 3 to 18 in the same
period. The number of cooperative banks decreased from 596 to 579.
The most important changes that would have the greatest impact on the banking sector
structure may include the planned mergers of banks:
1)GE Money Bank SA with Bank BPH SA;
2)Getin Bank SA with Noble Bank SA;
3)Sygma Bank SA with Cetelem Bank SA;
4)Santander Consumer SA with AIG Bank Polska SA.
Moreover, establishment of new branches of credit institutions is also planned, but the
global crisis may make changes of plans of certain investors. Another consequence of the
crisis may also be changes of strategic investors of Polish banks, in cause of rapid
weakening of financial condition of the parent company. They may decide to sell business
in Poland. Outside the territory of Poland, 4 banks conducted operations in the form of
banking companies or branches (PFSA, 2009: 33).
Research results show that banks should return to concentrating on deposit and credit
activity. They also require great regulation and oversight (EIU, 2009: 6–7).
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Polish banking sector is an integral element of the European banking system.
Therefore it is worth to compare it with other European Union Member States (Stefański,
2006b: 76–96). Considering the strong impact of financial crisis from years 2007–2008
on banks’ results do not to present date on performance of banking operations, but only
to present structural date (ECB, 2008: 76–106 and Annex). Dates are contained in table
9. Author is presented only chosen financial indicators of banking sectors of EU members
in period of 2004–2006.
In terms of assets, Polish banking sector is still small in comparison with EU–15. Its
assets hardly account for 1% of total assets of all EU member states, but on the other
hand it is the largest among the new member states accounting for over 30% of total assets
in this group. It is characteristic of Poland, as it is in the case of other new EU member
states, that not only the banking sector assets are very low, but also the relationship
between those assets and GDP. On the one hand, this proves that the economy has low
“banking culture”, but the other hand, this sector has great growth potential. In 2008 assets
to GDP ratio rapidly increased in Poland. Due to high increase in mortgage loans for
households in the last years, their share in GDP grew considerably, although it is still
much lower than in most EU members. However, the relatively low share in GDP does
not equal low risk for the sector.
Considering the number of operating credit institutions, Polish banking sector is one
of largest in Europe. However, the number of branches per 1 million residents is below
average. The level of concentration of the Polish banking sector, measured by the share
of the five largest banks in total assets of banking sector is slightly over the EU average
level. Ownership structure of the Polish banking sector is characteristic for the new EU
member states, where the share of foreign investors is very high.
The scope of operations of the Polish banking sector in the context of highly
developed EU member states is low, which proves low level of “ banking culture” of
Polish economy and the development potential of the sector.
Abank’s interest margin is one of the most important indicators of the cost of financial
intermediation. The NIM can be used as an indicator for the actual degree of competitive
condition of the market, but can also reflect other factors, such as market power and risk
appetite. NIM in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were substantially higher than the
EU average (CEC, 2009: 19). It was with values ranging from 2,12% to 3,82% in 2006
against on EU average of 1,87%.
Looking at the net non interest margins (NNM), it is higher in the new EU-12
members than in the old EU-15 members, i.e., over the period 2004–2006 the average
NNM was up to 72% higher in the EU-12 compared to the average NNM in the EU-15.
The efficiency of national banking markets, measured by the cost-to-income ratio,
which is a ratio expressing a company’s cost effectiveness differences between EU-15
and EU-12 were marginal on average in period of 2004–2006 (CEC, 2009: 22–23).
Despite marginal differences in cost-to-income ratios there were substantial
differences between the levels of expenses as a percentage of total assets across various
WSPÓŁCZESNA EKONOMIA Nr 3/2009(11)
50
Vizja - Kwartalnik 011-2009:Vizja 2009-10-29 10:33 Strona 50Nr 3/2009(11) WSPÓŁCZESNA EKONOMIA
51
Table 9. Polish banking sector in the context of other European Union Member States at the end of 2007
* 2006 data











































































































































































































































































































Austria 891 803 78 514 329 139 24 111 43 27 527
Belgium 1298 110 67 417 392 126 34 155 83 25 2079
Bulgaria 31 29 31 767 107 66 10 68 57 82 833
Cyprus 91 215 11 1151 607 273 47 350 65 32 1082
Czech Republic 140 56 40 181 110 53 15 73 66 92 1100
Denmark 978 189 50 399 429 221 104 79 64 19 1120
Estonia 21 15 6 205 131 96 35 57 96 97 3410
Finland 288 360 25 309 160 82 35 56 81 65 2540
France 6682 808 479 622 353 114 34 83 52 13 679
Greece 383 63 65 344 167 87 28 109 68 23 1096
Spain 2945 357 276 1013 281 177 59 144 41 12 459
The Netherlands 2195 341 114 220 392 193 70 157 86 18 1928
Ireland 1337 81 42 269 715 257 66 175 46 47 600
Lithuania 24 80 10 285 86 63 17 42 81 83 1827
Luxembourg 915 156 26 470 2542 533 41 822 28 95 276
Latvia 31 31 13 297 155 104 34 72 67 58 1158
Malta 38 22 4 260 760 405 40 280 70 42 1174
Germany 7562 2026 691 483 312 130 40 119 22 11 183
Poland 221 712 174 354 67 36 10 36 47 71 640
Portugal 440 175 61 569 270 158 62 118 68 23 1097
Romania 72 42 66 295 60 35 3 32 56 82 1041
Slovakia 50 26 20 216 91 45 11 57 68 96 1082
Slovenia 43 27 12 356 126 86 8 58 60 29 1282
Sweden 846 201 44 203 255 134 40 57 61 9 934
United Kingdom 10093 390 453* 204 500 288 54 290 41 53 449
Hungary 109 206 42 335 108 65 12 51 54 57 839
Italy 3332 821 342 560 217 112 17 73 33 17 330
EU27 41072 8348 3240 471 334 157 41 136 44 29 1102
Vizja - Kwartalnik 011-2009:Vizja 2009-10-29 10:33 Strona 51member states. A clear distinction could be seen between EU-15 and EU-12 banking
markets, with the latter having a substantially higher expense ratios. It is therefore
interesting to examine how this figure relates to overall profitability (CEC, 2009: 22).
Return on Equity (ROE) reflects the efficiency of own capital. There were substantial
differences between individual member states as well as between the EU-15 and the
EU-12 in the period of 2004–2006. The average ROE was 17,5% in the EU-15 and 20,9%
in the EU-12. Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden had profitability levels over the
EU-27 average level. The favourable economic conditions up to the summer of 2007 have
been an important driver for increasing overall profitability figures (CEC, 2009: 23).
Overall, ROE have declined due to financial turmoil, after 2007.
Polish banking sector has achieved positive indicators of effectiveness in 2008 (ECB,
2009a: 45–47). Ratio of solvency was also for good horizontal (ECB, 2009a: 54–57).
Polish banking sector is profitably presented on the background of banking sectors of
countries members of the European Union. Big number of banks (13) among fifty the
biggest banks in the Central and Eastern Europe region shows also power of polish
banking sector (Rzeczpospolita, 2009: 27).
Conclusions
It is possible to ascertain on the base carried through analysis, that banking sector







The Polish banking sector is stable and banks have to adopt a strategy that will enable
them to compete on the Single Market. The strategy should be based on a change of the
structure of revenues and costs, and on modification of the credit extending procedure.
This is confirmed by the comparison of the banking sector in Poland with the banking
sector of the best developed European Union countries. Differences are too big. 
The assets of the banking sector to GDP ratio in Poland was 82% in 2008. It was
higher than in almost all the new member countries (expecting Romania) and amounted
to about 334% on the average level in European Union countries. 
The number of inhabitants per branch in Poland was 3284 in 2007 (Austria – 1949,
Spain – 986, France – 1607, Germany –2068). It was higher than the average level in EU
countries (EU-27 – 2123). 
The value of assets per employee was EUR 1357 thousands in 2007. Lower value was
written down in Bulgaria and Romania. It means that efficiency of the Polish banking
sector was low. 
Population per ATM in Poland was 3837 in 2006 and it was the largest number in EU
(Romania – 3575; average level in EU-27 – 1362). The percentage margin or the
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Vizja - Kwartalnik 011-2009:Vizja 2009-10-29 10:33 Strona 52difference between the average interest rate on credits and deposits is twice high in Poland
as in EU-15 countries. Its further decline is expected. It may be very painful for banks in
Poland bearing in mind the long-term trend to decrease interest rates. 
Finally, the free flow of capital will also make Polish banks decrease bank charges,
much higher than in other EU-15 countries.
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Stresz cze nie
Głów nym  ce lem  opra co wa nia  jest  pre zen ta cja  wy bra nych  aspek tów  pol skie go  sek to -
ra  ban ko we go  w la tach  1989–2008.  Au tor  pod jął  pró bę  od po wie dzi  na  na stę pu ją ce  py -
ta nia:  (1)  Czy  pol ski  sek tor  ban ko wy  jest  sta bil ny?  (2)  Czy  ban ki  pro wa dzą ce  dzia łal ność
ope ra cyj ną  w Pol sce  są  przy go to wa ne  do  kon ku ro wa nia  na  Jed no li tym  Ryn ku  Eu ro pej -
skim?  (3)  Ja ka  jest  po zy cja  pol skie go  sek to ra  ban ko we go  w sek to rze  ban ko wym  państw
Unii  Eu ro pej skiej?
Po  dru giej  woj nie  świa to wej  sys tem  ban ko wy  prze szedł,  w tym  tak że  i sek tor,  prze szedł
dwie waż  ne trans  for  ma  cje ustro  jo  we: po 1946 r. i po 1989 r. Trze  cia trans  for  ma  cja za  czę  -
ła się 1 ma  ja 2004 r., ale ona nie ma cha  rak  te  ru ustro  jo  we  go. Pol  ski sek  tor ban  ko  wy roz  -
po czął  funk cjo no wa nie  na  Jed no li tym  Ryn ku  Eu ro pej skim  i przy go to wu je  się  do  przy ję -
cia  wspól nej  wa lu ty  eu ro.
W pierw szej  czę ści  opra co wa nia  przed sta wio no  prze mia ny  w sek to rze  ban ko wym  po
1989  r.,  wska zu jąc  na  pro ce sy  de mo no po li za cji,  li be ra li za cji,  re struk tu ry za cji,  pry wa ty -
za cji,  glo ba li za cji  (umię dzy na ro do wie nia)  i kon so li da cji.  Przed sta wio ne  pro ce sy  za cho -
dzi ły  w ban kach  ko mer cyj nych  i spół dziel czych  z róż nym  na si le niem  i nie  by ły  rów no le -
głe.  W dru giej  czę ści  opra co wa nia  pod ję to  pró bę  ana li zy  sy tu acji  eko no micz no -fi nan so -
wej  ban ków  w Pol sce.  Pol skie  ban ki  by ły  sta bil ne  w ana li zo wa nym  cza sie  i po sia da ły
płyn ność  fi nan so wa,  co  po twier dzo no  w ra por tach  NBP  i in sty tu cji  ra tin go wych.  Ta ką
oce nę  po twier dza  tak że  fakt  bra ku  in ter wen cji  fi nan so wej  w sek tor  ban ko wy  ze  stro ny
pol skie go  rzą du.  Po rów na nie  zy sków  ban ków  w la tach  1997–2008  wska zu je  na  ich  za leż -
ność  od  sy tu acji  eko no micz nej  i po li tycz nej  Pol ski.  Ban ki  w Pol sce  po sia da ły  wskaź ni ki
ade kwat no ści  ka pi ta ło wej  wyż sze,  niż  wy ma ga ne  mi ni mum.  Oce na  si ły  fi nan so wej  pol -
skie go  sek to ra  ban ko we go  nie  by ła  ko rzyst na.  Z ba dań  au to ra  wy ni ka,  że  je go  udział
w sek  to  rze ban  ko  wym państw UE nie jest ade  kwat  ny do udzia  łu pol  skie  go PKB w PKB
wszyst kich  państw  UE  (znacz nie  niż szy).  Wska za no  też  na  za cho dzą cy  pro ces  dez in ter me -
dia cji,  któ ry  na si lał  się  wraz  z roz wo jem  ryn ku  ka pi ta ło we go.  W trze ciej  czę ści  opra co -
wa nia  skon cen tro wa no  się  na  kie run kach  roz wo ju  pol skie go  sek to ra  ban ko we go  w naj -
bliż szych  la tach,  wska zu jąc  na  ko niecz ność  do koń cze nia  pry wa ty za cji  ban ków  i dal szą  ich
kon so li da cję.  Dal szy  roz wój  pol skie go  sek to ra  ban ko we go  uza leż nio ny  bę dzie  od  de cy zji
in we sto rów  za gra nicz nych,  któ rzy  po sia da ją  w nim  sil ną  po zy cję.  Kry zys  fi nan so wy  mo -
że  spo wo do wać,  że  bę dą  ono  ogra ni czać  za an ga żo wa nie  ka pi ta ło we  w pol skim  sek to rze
ban ko wym  na  rzecz  umac nia nia  ma cie rzy stych  in sty tu cji  kre dy to wych.  W czwar tej  czę ści
przed sta wio no  pol ski  sek tor  ban ko wy  na  tle  sek to ra  ban ko we go  państw  UE.  Z ana li zy
wy ni ka,  że  je go  po ten cjał  fi nan so wy  jest  ni ski  i cha rak te ry zu je  się  on  wie lo ma  nie ko rzyst -
ny mi  wskaź ni ka mi  w po rów na niu  do  ich  śred niej  wiel ko ści  w sek to rze  ban ko wym  państw
UE.  Opra co wa nie  za koń czo no  wnio ska mi  i udzie lo no  od po wie dzi  na  po sta wio ne  py ta nia
ba daw cze.
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